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Abstract
Casual empiricism suggests that additive trade costs, such as quotas, per-unit
tariffs, and, in part, transportation costs, are prevalent. In spite of this, we have
no broad and systematic evidence of the magnitude of these costs. We develop a
new empirical framework for estimating additive trade costs from standard firm-
level trade data. Our results suggest that additive barriers are on average 14
percent, expressed relative to the median price. The point estimates are strongly
correlated with common proxies for trade costs. Using our micro estimates, we
show that a reduction in additive trade costs produces much higher welfare gains
and growth in trade flows than a similar reduction in multiplicative trade costs.
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1 Introduction
The costs of international trade are the costs associated with the exchange of goods
and services across borders. Trade costs impede international economic integration and
may also explain a great number of empirical puzzles in international macroeconomics
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). Since Samuelson (1954), economists usually model and
estimate trade costs as multiplicative (iceberg) costs, implying that pricier goods are
costlier to trade. Yet, casual empiricism suggests that additive trade costs are preva-
lent.1 First, the pricing structure in shipping is often a fixed charge per unit (e.g. per
pound or cubic meter), and a percentage charge for insurance. For example, according
to UPS rates at the time of writing, a fee of $125 is charged for shipping a two pound
package from Oslo to New York (UPS Worldwide Saver), while they charge an addi-
tional 0.85% of the declared value for full insurance.2 Second, a number of trade policy
instruments also act like additive trade costs. 19 percent of U.S. non-agricultural im-
ports are subject to additive tariffs.3 Quotas (through the imposition of a quota license
price) also act like an additive tariff. In the U.S. and the European Union, 9.5 and
15.1 percent of the Harmonized System (HS) six-digit subheadings in the schedule of
agricultural concessions are covered by tariff quotas. Third, distribution costs are also
partly additive costs (e.g. Corsetti and Dedola, 2005).
Even though we can directly observe the magnitude of additive trade costs in some
specific cases, e.g. for a freight company or in a country’s tariff schedule, we have no
broad and systematic evidence of the magnitude of additive trade costs in international
trade. The first contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. We
present a general framework to structurally estimate the magnitude of additive trade
costs, using, now standard, firm-level trade data. Our methodology exploits a robust
theoretical mechanism that shapes the association between producer prices and demand
in the presence of additive costs. Specifically, as additive trade costs increase, the
demand elasticity in a market becomes less negative and especially so among low price
firms. This result holds for a wide range of utility functions. Our identification strategy
resembles a triple differences approach: we compare the change in elasticities across
1Multiplicative costs are defined as a constant percentage of the producer price per unit traded,
while additive costs are defined as a constant cost per unit traded (conditional on a product). We use
the terminology additive costs throughout the paper. Per-unit or specific trade costs are also terms
frequently used in the literature.
2The fee per pound varies according to origin and destination, while the insurance charge is inde-
pendent of origin and destination.
32006 data from the WTO are presented in Table 8. We discuss the data in more detail in the
appendix. Until the 1950’s, two-thirds of dutiable U.S. imports were subject to additive tariffs. This
proportion fell to less than 40 percent by the early 1970’s (Irwin, 1998).
2
high and low price firms, as we move to different export destinations with different
degrees of trade costs. Our methodology is robust to endogeneity concerns, as well
as quality heterogeneity and non-constant demand elasticities within narrowly defined
products (Section 4.3).
We apply our methodology to Norwegian firm-level trade data, and estimate trade
costs for a large number of countries and products. Several strong results emerge from
the empirical analysis. The unweighted mean of additive trade costs, expressed relative
to the median price, is 14 percent. Our estimates are strongly positively correlated
with observable proxies of trade costs, such as distance and product weight per value.
We emphasize that our methodology can only identify additive trade costs relative to
multiplicative costs, meaning that our estimates are a lower bound of the true value
of additive costs.4 Multiplicative costs are not separately identified by our framework,
and are, as such, largely left unexplored.
The second contribution of this paper is to show that the presence of additive
trade costs has important implications. First, gains from trade are potentially much
larger than in standard models (e.g. Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012a).
Using our micro estimates, we show that a reduction in additive trade costs would
imply higher welfare gains than a similar reduction in multiplicative trade costs. The
intuition is simple. If all firms within an industry charge the same price, then the
difference between additive and multiplicative trade costs is trivial. In the presence of
heterogeneity in prices, however, an additive trade barrier distorts the relative price of
two varieties both within markets and across markets. As a consequence, and as shown
by Alchian and Allen (1964), additive costs alter relative consumption patterns both
within and across markets. Multiplicative barriers, on the other hand, only distort
prices across markets.5 This additional margin of distortion is the reason why welfare
may be more adversely affected by additive than multiplicative barriers. Empirical
findings of the gains from trade (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002 and Feyrer, 2009) are often large
compared to the relatively modest gains predicted by the class of models considered
by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012a). Hence, this paper contributes
to reconciling the empirical and theoretical evidence. More generally, in our model,
heterogeneity among producers has aggregate implications, in contrast to Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012a).
4We estimate t˜ = t/τ , where t ≥ 0 represents additive costs and τ ≥ 1 represents multiplicative
(iceberg) costs. Hence, t = t˜τ ≥ t˜.
5E.g. the ratio of consumer prices for two varieties exported to the same market is
(τ p˜ (ω1) + t) / (τ p˜ (ω2) + t), where τ is the multiplicative barrier, t is the additive barrier, and p˜ (ωr)
is the producer price of variety ωr. The ratio equals relative producer prices p˜ (ω1) /p˜ (ω2) if t = 0.
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Second, again using our micro estimates, we show that removing additive barriers
produces much more trade than reducing multiplicative barriers. This result suggests
that inferring (iceberg) trade costs from trade flows using gravity models, as in Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2004), may overstate trade barriers, as additive costs dampen
trade much more than multiplicative costs. It is well known that standard models have
difficulties matching the growth in global trade over time (e.g., Yi, 2003); our results
suggest that additive trade costs may play an important role.
Third, standard trade models (e.g. Melitz, 2003) can predict zero bilateral trade
flows between any country pair only once fixed costs on the supply side are assumed in
combination with a particular productivity cut-off, as in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubin-
stein (2008), or after assuming a finite integer number of firms, as in Eaton, Kortum,
and Sotelo (2012). Our model offers a very natural way to reconcile empirics and
theory, without assuming arbitrary productivity cut-offs or abandoning the continuum
assumption. Since the presence of additive trade costs means that firm sales are always
bounded, then even the most productive firm may not find it profitable to enter the
export market.
In summary, we conclude that empirical and theoretical work should account for
both (the tip of the) iceberg costs, as well as the part of trade costs that are largely
hidden under the surface: additive costs.
More flexible modeling of trade costs is not new in international economics. Alchian
and Allen (1964) pointed out that additive costs imply that the relative price of two
varieties of some good will depend on the level of trade costs, and that relative de-
mand for the high quality good increases with trade costs (“shipping the good apples
out”). More recently, Hummels and Skiba (2004) found strong empirical support for
the Alchian-Allen hypothesis. Specifically, the elasticity of freight rates with respect to
price was estimated to be well below the unitary elasticity implied by the iceberg as-
sumption. However, the authors could not identify the magnitude of additive costs, as
we do here. Furthermore, our methodology identifies all kinds of trade costs, whereas
their paper was concerned with shipping costs exclusively.
Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei (2011) examine Chinese exports and productivity
growth before and after the elimination of externally imposed export quotas. Building
on the model in this paper, they reinterpret the additive tariff as a (common) quota
license fee which firms must pay in order to access restricted foreign markets. Martin
(2012) shows that the presence of additive trade costs is necessary to reconcile the
most commonly used theoretical framework with the empirical finding that individ-
ual firms set higher f.o.b. prices over long distances than over short ones, a sort of
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“reverse dumping”. Sørensen (2012) investigates the welfare impact of additive versus
multiplicative barriers in a symmetric two-country setting.
Our work also relates to a recent paper by Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012).
They introduce a model with heterogeneous firms and additive costs, but in their model
the additive component is interpreted as local distribution costs that are independent
of firm productivity. Their research question is very different, however, as their paper
analyzes pricing to market and the reaction of exporters to exchange rate changes. They
show that, in response to currency depreciation, high productivity firms optimally raise
their markup rather than the volume, while low productivity firms choose the opposite
strategy.
Finally, our work connects to the papers that quantify trade costs. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004) provides an overview of the literature, and recent contributions
\include Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Head and Ries
(2001), Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), Hummels (2007), and Jacks, Meissner,
and Novy (2008). This strand of the literature either compiles direct measures of
trade costs from various data sources, or infers a theory-consistent index of trade costs
by fitting models to cross-country trade data. Our approach of using the within-
market relationship between producer prices and exports is conceptually different and
provides a complimentary approach to inferring trade barriers from data. This is
possible thanks to the recent availability of detailed firm-level data. Furthermore,
whereas the traditional approach can only identify iceberg trade costs relative to some
benchmark, usually domestic trade costs, our method identifies the absolute level of
(additive) trade costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general frame-
work and summarizes its implications. Since the subsequent empirical framework is
formulated conditional on a set of general equilibrium variables, we do not specify a full
model here, but only the elements that are relevant to the empirical work. In Section
3, we describe the data and present some empirical patterns that are suggestive of the
presence of additive trade costs. Section 4 lays out the econometric strategy, presents
the baseline estimates, as well as validation exercises and robustness checks. In Section
5, we present a full general equilibrium model. Section 6 compares the welfare and
trade flows impact of additive versus ad valorem tariffs. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
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2 Basic Framework
In this section, we present a simple framework that features both iceberg and additive
trade costs. This framework relies on a small number of assumptions that are sufficient
to implement the empirical analysis of Section 4. We use the framework to derive two
propositions (Section 2.3). The first proposition relates quantity demanded to the
producer price and provides the backbone of the identification strategy of Section 4,
i.e. it shows why we are able to estimate additive trade costs. The second proposition
shows why additive trade costs can be more detrimental to welfare and trade flows than
multiplicative costs. Later, we present the full model, solve for the general equilibrium,
and quantify the impact of additive trade costs on welfare and trade flows.
2.1 Consumer Demand
We consider a world economy comprising N countries. Each country n is populated by
a measure Ln of workers. The economy consists of a differentiated goods sector and a
transport services sector. We describe the latter in detail in Section 5.1 and focus here
on the differentiated goods sector.
Preferences across varieties of the differentiated product have the standard CES
form with an elasticity of substitution σ > 1. Each variety enters the utility function
with its own exogenous country-specific weight ηn. These weights represent firm- and
destination-specific demand shocks. These preferences generate a demand function
An (pn/ηn)
1−σ in country n for a variety with price pn and demand shock ηn. The
demand level An ≡ YnP σ−1n depends on total expenditure Yn and the consumption-
based price index Pn.6
2.2 Variable Trade Costs
As in e.g. Hummels and Skiba (2004), the consumer price of a good depends on its
producer price, p˜, as well as on additive and multiplicative trade costs, t ≥ 0 and τ ≥ 1
respectively,
p = τ p˜+ t. (1)
Hence, total trade costs are partly proportional to the quantity shipped and partly
proportional to the producer price. In the estimation of Section 4, we always condition
on the observed producer (f.o.b.) price p˜ so that, at this stage, there is no need to
make any assumption about market structure.
6From now until Section 5, where we introduce the rest of the model, we drop the country subindex.
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2.3 Implications of Additive Trade Costs
We present two propositions that summarize a number of important properties of the
theoretical framework. The first proposition characterizes the relationship between
quantity demanded and producer price in the presence of additive trade costs, thereby
providing the backbone of the identification strategy to quantify additive trade costs.
The second proposition shows that additive trade costs act as a wedge both between
the consumer prices of local and imported goods and between the consumer prices of
different imported goods. Based on this result, we show in Section 6 that the gains in
terms of welfare and trade flows from eliminating additive trade costs are much higher
than those from eliminating multiplicative trade costs.7
2.3.1 Trade Costs and Demand Elasticities
The identification strategy we employ in Section 4 focuses on the elasticity of quantity
demanded with respect to the producer price. The following proposition characterizes
such an elasticity both in the absence and in the presence of additive trade costs.
Proposition 1. When t = 0, the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the
producer price (E), is equal to −σ. When t > 0, E = −σ/ [1 + t/ (τ p˜)], and the
elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs t is (i) negative and (ii) strictly
increasing in the producer price p˜.
The proposition shows that, in the presence of additive trade costs, the elasticity
of quantity demanded with respect to the producer price is a function of the additive
trade costs relative to the producer price and augmented by the iceberg cost. More-
over, Proposition 1 also shows that a higher additive trade cost “pushes” the elasticity
E towards zero (part (i)), and particularly so when the producer price is low (part
(ii)).8 As we will explain in more detail in Section 4.2, variation in the elasticity of
quantity demanded with respect to the producer price across product-market pairs can
be exploited to identify t/ (τ p˜).
We provide the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix and some intuition here.
Using the chain rule, E is the product of the elasticity of quantity demanded with
respect to the consumer price and the elasticity of the consumer price with respect to
the producer price. In the (widely used) case of CES preferences, the first elasticity
7A reader that is not interested in the estimation of additive trade costs but is interested in the
implications of such costs for welfare and for aggregate trade flows can read Proposition 2 and then
go directly to Section 5.
8Recall that E < 0 so that (∂E/∂t) / (t/E) carries the opposite sign of ∂E/∂t.
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does not depend on the level of the producer price and equals −σ, the (opposite of the)
elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. Therefore,
E (p˜, t, τ, σ) = −σ∂ ln p
∂ ln p˜
. (2)
In the absence of additive trade costs, the second elasticity is equal to one (using
equation (1)), so E is equal to −σ. In the presence of additive trade costs, the second
elasticity, ∂ ln p/∂ ln p˜, is a function of additive trade costs relative to the producer
price and augmented by the iceberg cost,
∂ ln p
∂ ln p˜
=
(
1 +
t
τ p˜
)−1
≥ 0. (3)
The intution is as follows. Additive trade costs act as a wedge between the consumer
price and the producer price. The size of the wedge depends on the magnitude of t
relative to τ p˜. The larger the wedge the weaker the relationship between the two prices
(i.e. the lower ∂ ln p/∂ ln p˜) and the higher E.9 The elasticity of quantity demanded
to the producer price is an increasing function of additive trade costs. The last part of
Proposition 1 states that the “dampening” effect of additive trade costs on the elasticity
between quantity demanded and producer price is stronger for low producer prices.
The intuition is straightforward: consider, for example, the limiting case in which the
producer price is so high that additive trade costs becomes negligible: changes in the
additive trade cost have zero impact on E. Hence, an increase in t always increases E
but the more so the lower is the producer price. In the appendix, we discuss Proposition
1 under different demand systems, and show that the main content of the proposition
continues to hold in a large class of demand systems.
We also refer the reader to Section 4.2, where we discuss identification more in
detail and also provide a graphical representation of the content of Proposition 1.
2.3.2 Additive Trade Costs as Wedges Between Prices
The next proposition shows that additive trade costs impose more wedges between
prices than multiplicative trade costs. As a consequence, a reduction in additive trade
costs is associated with larger gains from trade (Section 6). Moreover, Proposition 2
shows that the source of additional gains from trade is the interaction between additive
trade costs and producer price heterogeneity.
9Again, recall that E < 0.
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Consider two varieties. One has producer price p˜′ and consumer price p′. The
other variety is more expensive, with producer price p˜ = νp˜′ (ν > 1), and consumer
price p. Both varieties are exported to the same market and are subject to the same
additive trade cost t and multiplicative trade cost τ according to equation (1). Let
χ = (p/p′) / (p˜/p˜′) be the wedge between the relative consumer (p/p′) and producer
price (p˜/p˜′) of the high-producer price variety.
Proposition 2. When t = 0, χ = 1. When t > 0, (i) χ < 1; (ii) ∂χ/∂ (t/τ) < 0; and
∂ [∂χ/∂ (t/τ)] /∂ν < 0.
Proposition 2 shows that, in the absence of additive trade costs, the relative con-
sumer price of the two imported varieties equals their relative producer price. In other
words, multiplicative trade costs do not affect the relative consumer price in the im-
porting country. That’s not the case when there are additive trade costs. In the
presence of additive trade costs, the relative consumer price of the high-cost variety in
the importing country is lower than the relative producer price,
χ =
p
p′
p˜
p˜′
=
1 + tντ p˜′
1 + t
τ p˜′
< 1.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows how the wedge between the relative con-
sumer and producer price depends on the magnitude of the additive trade cost. Holding
producer prices constant,
∂χ
∂ (t/τ)
=
1− ν
νp˜′
(
1 + t
τ p˜′
)2 < 0,
since ν > 1. Since the additive trade cost is the same for both varieties, an increase
in t reduces the relative consumer price of the high price variety. Note that, in the
absence of additive trade costs, an increase in multiplicative trade costs does not affect
χ, which remains equal to one. The additional price wedge associated with additive
trade costs is the reason why gains from trade may be quite different in a model with
additive trade costs compared to a model with multiplicative trade costs (Section 5).
The last part of Proposition 2 shows that the impact of additive trade costs on χ is
stronger the higher the degree of heterogeneity in producer prices, i.e. the higher is ν,
∂
∂ν
(
∂χ
∂ (t/τ)
)
= − 1
ν2p˜′
(
1 + t
τ p˜′
)2 < 0.
We explore this intuition more formally in Section 6. Before turning to some suggestive
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evidence of the presence of additive trade costs, we make two final remarks. First,
Proposition 2 is entriely independent from our assumption of CES preferences, and
just relies on equation (1). Second, under some regularity conditions about demand
(see e.g. Hummels and Skiba, 2004), an increase in t raises relative consumption of the
high price variety relative to the low price variety. This is the well-known Alchian-Allen
effect (Alchian and Allen, 1964).
3 Empirical Regularities
In this section, we present the data set used and some empirical patterns that are
suggestive of the presence of additive trade costs. In the next section, we move on to
estimating additive trade costs formally.
3.1 Data
The data cover all Norwegian non-oil exporters in 2004 and originate from customs
declarations. Every export observation is associated with a firm r, a destination n and a
product k, the quantity transacted xknr and the total value.10 We calculate f.o.b. prices
p˜knr by dividing total value by quantity. We define a product as a Harmonized System
8-digit (HS8) nomenclature category. The sample covers 17, 480 firms, exporting 5, 391
products to 203 destinations.
In 2004, total exports amount to NOK 232 billion (≈ USD 34.4 billion), or 48
percent of the aggregate manufacturing revenue. On average, each firm exported 5.6
products to 3.4 destinations for NOK 13.3 million (≈ USD 2.0 million). On average,
there are 3.0 firms per product-destination pair, with a standard deviation of 7.8. As
we will see in Section 4, our quantitative framework utilizes the relationship between
f.o.b. price and export quantity across firms within a product-destination pair. In
the formal econometric model, we therefore choose to restrict the sample to product-
destinations where more than 40 firms are present.11 In the robustness section, we
evaluate the effect of this restriction by estimating the model on an expanded set of
destination-product pairs. Extreme values of quantity sold, defined as values below the
1st percentile or above the 99th percentile for every product-destination are dropped
10The unit of measurement depends on the characteristics of the product. E.g. gloves and skis are
measured in pairs, while mineral water is measured in liters. Firm-product-destination-year obser-
vations are recorded in the data as long as the f.o.b. exports value is NOK 1000 (≈ USD 148) or
higher.
11Also, the objective function is relatively CPU intensive, and this restriction saves us a significant
amount of processing time.
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from the sample. All in all, this brings down the total number of products to 121
and the number of destinations to 21. Exports to all possible combinations of these
products and destinations amount to 26.2% of total exports. In the robustness section
we consider an alternative sample that covers about 58.9% of total exports.
Several features of the Norwegian data are consistent with those from other coun-
tries. For example, Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013) report that firm-level
facts for Norwegian exporters are consistent with those for French exporters shown in
Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2011.
3.2 Suggestive Evidence
Proposition 1 shows that the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs is
negative and increasing in the producer price. In the following exercise, we provide
evidence that these implications hold in the data, using distance between Norway and
the destination country as a proxy for additive trade costs. We regress export volume
(xknr) on a full set of interactions between f.o.b. price (p˜knr), distance (Distn) and
a dummy equal to one if the price is above the product-destination median price,
Mknr ≡ 1 [p˜knr > medianr (p˜knr)],
lnxknr = αkn + [ln p˜knr ×× lnDistn ××Mknr] β + εknr,
where ×× denotes the full set of interactions and β is the vector of coefficients. We also
include product-destination fixed effects (αkn) to exploit variation across firms within a
product-destination cell, as suggested by the theory. The relationship between quantity
exported and f.o.b. price is
Eknr =
∂ lnxknr
∂ ln p˜knr
= β1 + β2 lnDistn + β3Mknr + β4 (lnDistn ×Mknr) ,
which is allowed to vary between low- and high-price firms (β3), and is allowed to
depend on distance from Norway, with the slope being different for low-price (β2) and
high-price firms (β2 + β4). We expect to find a positive coefficient for β2, showing that
distance increases the negative elasticity of demand (i.e. that the elasticity approaches
zero). We also expect to find a negative coefficient for β4, showing that the “dampening”
effect of additive trade costs is smaller for high-price firms.
Since the error εknr is presumably correlated with prices, the estimated coeffi-
cients will not reflect the true demand elasticity. In the formal econometric model
in Section 4 we show that identification of additive trade costs does not rely on iden-
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Table 1: Exports volumes and f.o.b. prices.
OLS IV
ln p˜knr × lnDistn ×Mknr (β4) -0.04a (0.01) -0.13a (0.04)
ln p˜knr (β1) -1.15a (0.08) -2.98a (0.64)
ln p˜knr × lnDistn (β2) 0.04a (0.01) 0.29a (0.09)
Mknr -2.52a (0.62) -3.88b (1.89)
ln p˜knr ×Mknr (β3) 0.40a (0.10) 1.13a (0.29)
lnDistn ×Mknr 0.22b (0.09) 0.28 (0.28)
Product-destination FE Yes Yes
IV No Yes
R2 0.59 0.35
Number of observations 66,403 33,445
Notes: The dependent variable is log exports volume. Only product-destinations with
more than 10 firms are included in the sample. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by product-destination in column 1. Significance levels: a 1%; b 5%.
tifying the true demand elasticity. Nevertheless, we also create an instrument for
prices. In the spirit of Hausman (1996), we use the average price in other markets,
zknr = [1/ (Nkr − 1)]
∑
m∈S−knr pkmr, where Nkr is the number of export destinations by
firm-product kr and S−knr is the set of destinations served by firm-product kr, except
destination n. We expect the price in other markets to be strongly correlated with the
price charged in destination n, while not directly affecting demand in market n. In
other words, we assume that prices are correlated due to cost shocks and not demand
shocks. Since the interaction terms are presumably also endogenous, we construct in-
struments for them as well (e.g ln p˜knr× lnDistn is instrumented by ln zknr× lnDistn).
Results from the estimations are presented in Table 1. Column (1) is estimated with
ordinary least squares, while in column (2) we instrument prices with prices in other
markets.12 Our results strongly support the theoretical implications of Proposition 1:
the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs (proxied by distance) is negative
and increasing in the producer price. Specifically,
∂Eknr
∂Distn
Distn
Eknr
=
{ 1
Eknr|Mknr=0 β2 < 0 if Mknr = 0
1
Eknr|Mknr=1 (β2 + β4) < 0 if Mknr = 1
.
The magnitudes of the previous expressions can be easily computed, and their signs can
be checked, using the coefficients in Table 1 and knowing that average (log) distance
between Norway and foreign destinations is about 7.6 (i.e. about 2,000 km). Using OLS
12The first stage regressions are overall strong, with overall R-square values of 0.25, 0.71, 0.74, 0.08,
0.24 and 0.08 for the 6 first stage regressions.
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estimates (Table 1, column 1), the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs
is about -0.04 for low-price firms, and zero for high-price firms. Using IV estimates
(Table 1, column 2), the corresponding values are even larger in absolute value, being
-0.37 for low-price firms and -0.25 for high-price firms.
4 Estimating Trade Costs
In this section we structurally estimate the magnitude of trade costs, for every desti-
nation and every product in our sample. The intuition underlying our identification
strategy is the following. If we had data on both producer and consumer prices for
each export transaction, additive trade costs could be inferred by regressing consumer
prices on producer prices (equation (1)). Unfortunately, that is not feasible since our
data (as most of the transaction-level data sets) only include producer (f.o.b.) prices
and quantities. However, since quantity demanded is a function of consumer prices,
we can infer consumer prices from demand, and indirectly compare producer and con-
sumer prices. Proposition 1 shows that the demand elasticity E contains information
on additive trade costs. Moreover, Proposition 1 implies that the decrease in the ab-
solute value of the demand elasticity E in response to an increase in additive trade
costs is larger for low-price compared to high-price firms. It is this mechanism that
provides identification and that allows us to recover estimates of trade costs consistent
with our model. The methodology is reminiscent of a triple difference approach, where
trade costs are identified by comparing the difference in the elasticity of the volume
of exports to f.o.b. prices between low- and high-price firms, for a particular product,
across destinations.13
The econometric strategy consists of finding expected exports volume conditional on
the producer price charged by minimizing the sum of squared residuals using nonlinear
least squares.14 This strategy has, at least, three merits. First, we do not need to
simulate a full general equilibrium to estimate trade costs. Second, we do not need
assumptions about market structure or about the firm productivity distribution, as we
13In a previous version of this paper (Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla, 2010), we identified
additive trade costs from the exports volume distribution alone, without using information on prices.
Even though the identifying assumption was very different from that used in this version of the paper,
the previous methodology produced remarkably similar results.
14We choose to use data for exports volume (quantities) instead of export sales for the following
reasons. First, using quantities instead of sales minimizes measurement error due to imperfect impu-
tation of transport/insurance costs. Second, we avoid transfer pricing issues when trade is intra-firm
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2006). Third, we do not get closed form expressions for the estimation
equation when using sales value.
13
condition on observed f.o.b. prices. Third, since firm-level trade data by product and
destination are now widely available, our methodology can be applied to a range of
different countries and time periods.
4.1 Estimation
We employ a simple nonlinear least squares estimator where the objective is to minimize
the squared difference between expected and actual log exports volume. The starting
point is the quantity demanded equation xn = Anp−σn ησ−1n of Section 2.1. First, since
we have data on quantities and prices for each firm-product-destination triplet, we add
subscripts k (product) and r (firm) to the consumer price p and quantity x. Second,
we allow the intercept term A to be product-destination-specific and the elasticity
of substitution σ to be product-specific. We also allow the firm-product-destination-
specific demand shock ln ηknr to be correlated with the corresponding consumer price
ln pknr (see Section 4.3). All in all, these changes imply the following equation,
lnxknr = akn − σk ln pknr + (σk − 1) ln ηknr, (4)
where the demand shifter akn = lnAkn = lnYkn + (σk − 1) lnPkn captures total expen-
diture and the price index of product k in market n.
The consumer price pknr is unobserved, but the f.o.b. price p˜knr is observable in our
data. We substitute pknr with p˜knr using pknr = τknp˜knr + tkn. The resulting estimating
equation is
lnxknr = a˜kn − σk ln
(
p˜knr + t˜kn
)
+ knr, (5)
where t˜kn ≡ tkn/τkn is our coefficient of interest,  ≡ (σk − 1) ln ηknr and the intercept
term a˜kn ≡ akn − σk ln τkn.
Finally, we decompose t˜kn into product- and destination-specific fixed effects, t˜kn =
t˜k t˜n, and normalize t˜k = 1 for k = 1. The normalization is similar to the one adopted
in the estimation of two-way fixed effects in the employer-employee literature (Abowd,
Creecy, and Kramarz, 2002). Even though t˜k is estimated relative to some normaliza-
tion, the estimate of t˜kn is invariant to the choice of normalization.15 This decompo-
sition enables us to identify trade costs that are due to product and market charac-
teristics separately. We also decompose a˜kn = a˜ka˜n, and normalize a˜k = 1 for k = 1.
15We also need to ensure that all products and destinations belong to the same mobility group.
The intuition is that if a market is only served by one product, then one cannot separate the product
from the destination effect. In the robustness section we check whether our estimates are sensitive to
the trade cost decomposition t˜kn = tk t˜n by estimating t˜kn directly for all possible product-destination
pairs.
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This restriction helps us keeping down the number of coefficients to estimate. Finally,
we minimize, with respect to the coefficient vector Ψ =
(
t˜k, t˜n, σk, a˜k, a˜n
)
k∈K,n∈Nk , the
sum of squared residuals
O (Ψ) =
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
∑
r∈Rkn
̂2knr,
where K is the set of products in the sample, Nk is the set of active destinations for
product k, and Rkn is the set of firms exporting product k to destination n.16
4.2 Identification of trade costs
We discuss identification in the context of an example. Consider two products, feather
(F) and stone (S) exported from Norway to Sweden (SE) and Japan (JP). Suppose
the additive trade cost is larger for stone (than for feather) and for Japan (than for
Sweden). That would likely be the case for transportation costs since stone is heavier
than feather and Japan is more distant than Sweden from Norway. Figure 1 shows
f.o.b. prices on the horizontal axis and quantity demanded for a simple numerical
example (σk = 1, t˜JP/t˜SE = 10, t˜S/t˜F = 5). Additive trade costs are minimal in
the case of feather shipped to Sweden: Figure 1 shows that the quantity demanded
function in this case is almost linear, consistent with Proposition 1. As we move from
Sweden to Japan, the quantity demanded function becomes more concave for low f.o.b.
prices while it does not change much for high f.o.b. prices. This is, again, consistent
with Proposition 1: the increase in the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to
the f.o.b. price, E, in response to an increase in additive trade costs (from Sweden to
Japan), is larger for low-price compared to high-price firms.
The trade cost product and destination fixed effects, t˜k and t˜n, are identified by
comparing differences in the slopes of the quantity demanded function for low-price
versus high-price firms across products for a given destination or across destinations
for a given product. The methodology is therefore reminiscent of a triple difference ap-
proach, where trade costs are identified from the change in the difference in elasticities
between low- and high price firms, as we compare different markets.
A potential concern is that the slope coefficients σk are not separately identified from
the trade cost coefficients t˜kn, since they are all identified from the slope and curvature
of the demand function. This is where our use of both the product and destination
16In practice, we minimize O(.) under a set of lower and upper bounds and linear inequalities,
since this speeds up the search for the global minimum. The lower and upper bounds are [−20, 20]
for
(
ln t˜k, ln t˜n, σk, a˜k, a˜n
) ∀k ∈ K,∀n ∈ Nk, while the linear inequalities are ln t˜k + ln t˜n < 2 ln p˜kn
∀k ∈ K,∀n ∈ Nk, where p˜kn is the median producer price in product-destination kn.
15
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Figure 1: Identification.
dimensions of the data, as well as the corresponding two-way fixed effects, becomes
important. Suppose we are interested in finding the trade cost parameter to Japan,
t˜JP . Given information that trade costs to Sweden are low, the demand coefficients σF
and σS are identified, as trade costs have a negligible impact on curvature in Sweden.
Given σF and σS, we can back out trade costs to Japan, t˜JP , by examining the deviation
from these slopes among low-price firms.
A different concern is that our model assumes that the demand elasticity with
respect to the consumer price is constant, while this may not be true in the data. In
terms of Figure 1, this means that the demand schedule for Sweden and feather might
not be linear, even in the absence of additive trade costs. We discuss this case in the
appendix, and show that Proposition 1 and the identification strategy would still hold
in this case.
Finally, a comment about the interpretation of the results. Our methodology only
allows identification of t˜kn ≡ tkn/τkn. When commenting on the magnitude of additive
trade costs in Section 4.4, we divide the estimates of t˜kn by the observed median
16
f.o.b. price in product-destination kn, i.e. TCkn = (tkn/τkn) /p˜kn. In other words,
we measure additive trade costs relative to the f.o.b. price multiplied by the iceberg
cost. As a consequence, our estimates of additive trade costs would be higher if we had
information about τkn and were to report tkn/p˜kn.
4.3 Discussion
In this section, we address a number of potential concerns with our empirical frame-
work.
Endogeneity. A potential issue is that prices and quantities are determined simul-
taneously, so that the error term is correlated with the explanatory variables. Our
estimator for t˜kn is, however, robust to supply side mechanisms that make p˜knr endoge-
nous. For example, assume that firms facing favorable demand shocks knr also charge
higher prices, e.g. knr = φk ln pknr+vknr where vknr is an i.i.d. error term. In that case,
the estimating equation would be similar to equation (5), the only difference being the
interpretation of the slope parameter, which would take the form σk + φk. Therefore,
even though the interpretation of the slope parameter would change, the estimate of
t˜kn would not. In general, the slope coefficient is a mixture of various structural supply
and demand side parameters and any particular element is not separately identified
(e.g. the demand elasticity σk). Identification of the trade cost coefficient is instead
based on systematic nonlinear deviations from this equilibrium relationship between
price and quantity.
Quality heterogeneity within and across markets. A related concern is that unob-
served quality could be correlated with f.o.b. prices. As long as unobserved quality
can be written as a linear function of the (log) price, we would get biased slope coef-
ficients σk, whereas the estimates of trade costs would remain unchanged. Hence, our
methodology is robust to unobserved quality heterogeneity within HS-8 product cate-
gories. Furthermore, a model with firms varying their level of quality across markets
for a given product, perhaps due to country income differences such as in Verhoogen,
2008, would not affect the estimate of trade costs. In our framework, quality differences
across markets would be captured by the constant term a˜kn in the demand equation
(5).
Selection bias. Firms are not randomly entering into different product-destinations
and this can create a correlation between prices and the error term. We hypothesize
that the correlation is positive, since firms with both adverse demand shocks and high
prices are less likely to be exporting. Analogous to the case with endogenous prices,
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such a selection effect would only affect the slope parameters, and not the estimates of
trade costs. We refer the reader to appendix A.4 for further details.
A different selection issue is that product-destination pairs characterized by high
additive trade costs might not be active at all and, therefore, not appear in our data.
Indeed, one of the implications of additive trade costs, that we illustrate in Section 5, is
that even the most productive firm receives finite revenues that may not be sufficient to
cover the entry cost in a given export market. Hence, we are only able to identify trade
costs of traded goods, in contrast to all potentially tradable goods. This is an inherent
constraint with our methodology, and we emphasize that average trade costs for all
goods, including non-traded goods, might be even higher than the ones we uncover
here.
Interpretation. We emphasize that although t˜kn is, by definition, constant across
firms within an HS-8 product category (e.g. same $20 trade cost for all pairs of shoes
exported to the U.S.), our framework allows for total trade costs that vary across firms
within a product-destination pair. Iceberg costs, τkn, are controlled for because they
are subsumed into the intercept terms a˜kn. Hence, any mechanism that would make
t˜kn vary systematically with product value would be subsumed into these terms. This
shows that the t˜kn that we identify is, by definition, the cost that is constant across all
firms within a product-destination pair.
4.4 Results
Given the estimates of t˜n and t˜k, we calculate trade costs relative to f.o.b. prices,
TCkn = t˜kn/p˜kn, where p˜kn is the median f.o.b. price in product-destination pair kn.
We report various moments of TCkn in Table 2.17 The unweighted mean of TCkn,
averaged over all products and destinations, is 0.14. The weighted mean and median
are smaller, suggesting that product-destination pairs with low trade costs have higher
export volumes. As expected, trade costs are heterogeneous: the standard deviation
of TCkn is 0.20, while the 75/25 percentile ratio is 9.59.
95 and 88 percent of the t˜n and t˜k coefficients (the destination and product fixed
effects) are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.18 This suggests that, for
the large majority of product-destination pairs, the null hypothesis of zero additive
17A few point estimates are in the far left and right tail of the distribution, and they tend to
disproportionally affect the means. We therefore truncate our point estimates to values within the
5th to 95th percentile of the distribution.
18As t˜n and t˜k are estimated in logs, the null hypotheses are ln t˜k = ln ε−ln t˜n and ln t˜n = ln ε−ln t˜k,
where ε = 1 is an arbitrary small amount of trade costs, in NOK, and ln t˜n and ln t˜k are the average
of the log fixed effects. The alternative hypotheses are ln t˜k > ln ε− ln t˜n and ln t˜n > ln ε− ln t˜k.
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Table 2: Estimates of additive trade costs relative to f.o.b. prices
Weighted
mean
Unweighted
mean Median Std. deviation
Trade costs TCkn 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.20
σk -0.73 -1.49 -1.10 1.85
Criterion function 48,410
R2 0.42
# of Countries 21
# of Products 121
Note: The mean, median, and standard deviation of trade cost estimates are computed
only over product-destination pairs where the f.o.b. price is non-missing. The weighted
average is computed using exports value weights.
trade costs (i.e. a model with iceberg costs exclusively) is rejected.19 Although the
magnitude of the average TCkn is relatively small, the economic consequences of those
costs are potentially large. We investigate the welfare effects of our estimates in Section
6.
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the kernel density of the slope coefficients σk, while
the bottom panel shows the kernel density of the intercept coefficients a˜kn.20 For most
products, σk is negative, meaning that higher prices translate into lower sales volumes.
The overall fit of the model is adequate, with an R2 of 0.44. We plot actual export
volumes and prices (lnxknr and p˜knr) as well as the conditional expectation of export
volumes for a few product-destination pairs. In Figure 3, we have chosen all export
destinations for product HS 73269000, one of the top products in terms of export
value.21 The solid markers represent the conditional expectation whereas ’x’ markers
represent the data. F.o.b. prices are on the horizontal axis and export volumes on the
vertical axis (in logs). We observe that the model is able to capture a substantial share
of the variation in the data.
In the next section we present the results of a number of exercises aimed at vali-
dating our estimates. We also provide a number of robustness checks.
19We also test the hypothesis that all t˜kn = 0 formally. Let nT be the number of observations, Ψres
the vector of restricted coefficients (all t˜kn = 0), and Ψunres the vector of unrestricted coefficients.
Then the likelihood ratio statistic 2nT [O (Ψres)−O (Ψunres)], is χ2 (r) distributed under the null,
where r is the K +N − 1 restrictions. The null is rejected at any conventional p-value.
20To improve readability, values below/above the 5th/95th percentile are dropped from the kernel
densities.
21Articles of iron or steel, excl. cast articles or articles of iron or steel wire.
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Figure 2: Estimates of σk and a˜kn. Kernel densities.
4.5 Validation and Robustness
4.5.1 Validation
In this section, we perform a first validation of our empirical results by correlating the
destination component of our trade cost estimates, t˜n, with distance between Norway
and the destination countries; we also correlate our overall trade cost measure, TCkn,
with the actual product weight per unit of value. We expect, in both cases, a positive
relationship: transportation costs are increasing both in distance and weight (Hummels
and Skiba, 2004), and transportation costs are largely additive.22
Figure 4 shows our estimates of t˜n, for every destination, on the vertical axis against
distance on the horizontal axis. Both variables are expressed in logarithmic terms.
Estimated trade costs are increasing in actual trade costs, as proxied by distance.
Note that our two-way fixed effects approach implies that t˜n does not depend on the
set of products actually exported to n. This implies that there is no selection bias in
Figure 4, e.g. that low t˜kn products are sold in one destination and high t˜kn products in
22Referring back to the UPS example in the introduction (see footnote 2), t/τ is increasing in
distance and weight, while τ is independent of shipping distance and weight.
20
−2 0 2 4 6 8
0
10
20
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
DE
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
10
20
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
DK
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
5
10
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
FI
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
10
20
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
GB
0 2 4 6 8
0
5
10
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
NL
−2 0 2 4 6 8
0
10
20
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
PL
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
10
20
log f.o.b. price
lo
g 
X
SE
 
 
Data
Model
Figure 3: Predicted and actual exports volumes (normalized). HS73269000: articles of
iron or steel.
another destination. According to our estimates, trade costs to the U.S. are about 90
percent higher than trade costs to the Netherlands. The robust relationship between
distance and trade costs also emerges when regressing estimated trade costs t˜n on a
set of gravity variables (distance, GDP, and GDP per capita, all in logs). The distance
elasticity is then 0.23 (s.e. 0.10).23
Figure 5 shows the relationship between TCkn and actual average weight/value
across products. Both variables are expressed in logarithmic terms.24 Since heavier and
bulkier goods are more expensive to ship, we expect a positive relationship between
weight/value and estimated trade costs. Indeed, the scatter plot shows an upward
sloping relationship, with a correlation of 0.32 (p-value 0.002). Most of the estimates
in the product dimension also make intuitive sense. For example, aluminum profiles
(HS 76042900) are among the products with estimated TCkn above the 95th percentile.
23The GDP and GDP/capita elasticities are not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.
The full set of results is available upon request.
24Average weight/value is obtained by dividing total weight (summed over firms) over total value
(summed over firms) in Sweden. We condition on Sweden to minimize selection effects and to maximize
the number of products with non-missing values. Estimated trade costs per product are simply TCkSE .
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Figure 4: Estimates of t˜n and distance (logs).
Lightweight computer equipment (HS 84713000) is among the products with estimated
TCkn below the 5th percentile.25
A Monte Carlo Experiment. We evaluate the precision of our estimates using a
Monte Carlo simulation. We simulate the full general equilibrium model, presented in
Section 5, to generate 200 datasets of f.o.b. prices and quantities for a few destinations
and products, and estimate additive trade costs using the methodology from Section
4.1. Our methodology recovers the true value of additive trade costs with high precision.
We start by drawing 200 i.i.d. lognormally distributed demand shocks knr for
each firm-destination-product combination. For each realization of knr, we solve the
model for three export destinations and two products according to the steps shown in
appendix A.3. The full set of parameters used in the simulation is shown in Table 3.
The chosen values of ln t˜n and ln t˜p correspond to trade costs tkn/τkn relative to the
median export price (TCkn) between 0.09 and 0.35. The model generates 200 simulated
25HS 76042900 = “Bars, rods and solid profiles, of aluminium alloys”; HS 84713000 = “Data-
processing machines, automatic, digital, portable, weighing <= 10 kg, consisting of at least a central
processing unit, a keyboard and a display”.
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Figure 5: Estimates of TCkn and weight/value (in logs).
datasets consisting of f.o.b. prices p˜knr and quantities exported xknr. For each simulated
dataset, we estimate the reduced form model of equation (5). The results are shown in
the lower part of Table 3. The average of the estimated values of ln t˜n and ln t˜k, across
all samples, is very close to the true value, both across destinations and products.
The values in parentheses are the standard deviations of the estimates, showing that
the standard errors are acceptable, even in this artificial sample with relatively few
observations.26
4.5.2 Robustness
In Table 4 we present some re-estimations of the model that address several issues.
First, we check whether our estimates are sensitive to the trade cost decomposition
t˜kn = t˜k t˜n by estimating t˜kn directly for all possible product-destination pairs. As there
are no longer any interlinkages between different products, we minimize the objective
26The artificial sample consists, on average, of 546 exporters per product-destination, for 2 products
and 3 destinations.
23
Table 3: Monte Carlo Simulation.
True
ln t˜n -2.30 -1.61 -1.20
ln t˜k -0.22
Estimated
ln t˜n -2.32 -1.62 -1.20
(0.31) (0.19) (0.14)
ln t˜k -0.22
(0.01)
Avg. obs per prod.-dest. 546
Avg. criterion f 0.34
Note: The estimated values of ln t˜n and ln t˜k are average values across the 200 simulated samples. The values in
parentheses are standard deviations of the estimates. Estimates of σk, a˜k and a˜n are omitted from the table. The following
parameters are used in the simulated model, see Section 5: σ = 4, R = 2000, wiLi = 1, τin = 1, fin = 0.6, κ = 0.12.
Productivity z is distributed Pareto with shape parameter γ = 4. Demand shocks knr are i.i.d. lognormal , lnN (0, .2), which
implies that the standard deviation of ln  is approximately 11 percent of the mean of log of home sales.
Table 4: Robustness: Alternative specifications
Separate estimations
for each product (R1)
Product-destinations
with ≥ 20 firms (R2)
Trade costs,
weighted mean 0.04 0.04
unweighted mean 0.10 0.10
median 0.08 0.09
std. deviation 0.08
# product-destinations 270 917
# of countries (N) 21 33
# of products (K) 212 378
function product by product.27 As shown in column (R1), the results are very close to
the baseline case.
We also investigate whether the choice of truncating the data set to product-
destinations with more than 40 firms affects the results. We choose product-destinations
with more than 20 firms, resulting in 33 destinations and 378 products. Exports to
all possible combinations of these products and destinations amount to 58.9 percent of
total export value. The increase in product-destination pairs makes joint estimation
computationally infeasible, so we proceed by estimating product by product, as above.
The estimate of average trade costs is again very similar to the baseline case, as shown
27The main disadvantage of this approach is that estimates of the trade costs per country are partly
driven by selection of different products to different markets.
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in column (R2).
5 Back to Theory: General Equilibrium
So far, we have estimated trade costs from a parsimonious framework that highlights the
relationship between sales and producer prices, with sparse assumptions about market
structure, technologies, and without needing to solve for the general equilibrium. This
section completes the presentation of the model. This is a necessary tool to evaluate
gains from trade in a world with both additive and multiplicative trade costs, and
to quantify the importance of additive trade costs in shaping aggregate trade flows
(Section 6).
Our model builds on Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kra-
marz (2011), but we depart from the previous literature in two important respects.
First, we introduce additive trade costs. Second, we allow for two, potentially corre-
lated, layers of heterogeneity: productivity heterogeneity at the firm-level and demand
shocks at the firm-destination level.28 Higher values of the demand shock, resulting in
higher demand for a given price, can be interpreted as being associated with higher
quality (Khandelwal, 2010, Sutton, 1991). By allowing for a (positive) correlation be-
tween demand shocks and prices, we can account for the possibility that the largest
exporters are not necessarily the lowest-cost firms.
An implication of the model is that, in the presence of finite additive trade costs,
firm revenues are always finite. Hence, even for the most productive firm, latent export
revenues may not be sufficient to cover the export market entry cost. This opens up
the possibility of zero trade flows between country-pairs, without the need to impose
any bound on the support of the productivity distribution (as in Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein, 2008) and without treating the set of firms as finite (as in Eaton, Kortum,
and Sotelo, 2012).
5.1 Additive Trade Costs
To introduce additive trade costs in the simplest way we assume that the economic
environment includes a transport sector, whose services are used as an intermediate
input in final goods production. Before going into the specifics, two remarks are nec-
essary. First, as mentioned above, our intepretation of additive trade costs is much
28Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Opromolla (2013) also allow
for firm-destination-specific demand shocks but they are uncorrelated with the productivity draws.
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broader than transport costs but we adopt this modelling terminology for simplicity.
Second, the way we introduce additive costs in the model is, in practical terms, very
similar to the widely used assumption of a frictionless homogeneous good sector.
Transport services are freely traded and produced under constant returns to scale.
ϕmTin units of labor are necessary for transferring one unit of a good from a plant
in i to its final destination in n, using shipping services from country m. The sector
is perfectly competitive, so there is a global shipping service price wmϕmTin for each
route, where wm is the wage in country m. Relative wages between any two countries
i and n are then pinned down in all markets, as long as each country produces the
shipping service, and are equal to wi/wn = ϕn/ϕi. By normalizing the price on a
particular shipping route to one, say from i to n, all nominal wages are pinned down.
The additive trade cost is then defined as tin ≡ wlϕlTin = wmϕmTin, ∀ l,m (i.e. same
cost irrespective of the nationality of the shipping supplier).
5.2 Prices
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of both their technology, associated with productivity
z, and their set of destination-specific demand shocks {ηn}n=1,...,N . A firm in country
i can access market n only after paying a destination-specific fixed cost fin, in units
of the numéraire. Given labor costs wi and the variable trade costs tin and τin, profits
are
xin [pin − wiτin/z − tin]− fin,
where xin = Anησ−1n p
−σ
in is the quantity demanded.29 Given a monopolistically compet-
itive market structure and preferences, a firm with efficiency z maximizes profits by
setting its consumer price as a constant markup over total marginal production cost,
pin =
σ
σ − 1
(wiτin
z
+ tin
)
. (6)
Exploiting the relationship between consumer prices, pin, and producer (f.o.b.)
prices, p˜in,
pin = τinp˜in + tin, (7)
the producer price can be written as
p˜in =
σ
σ − 1
(
wi
z
+
tin
στin
)
. (8)
29As a convention, we assume that additive trade costs are paid on the "melted" output.
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Note that the markup over production costs is no longer constant. All else equal, a
more efficient firm will charge a higher markup, since the perceived elasticity of demand
that such a firm faces is lower. In other words, the markup is higher for more efficient
firms since, due to the presence of additive trade costs, a larger share of the consumer
price does not depend on the producer price.
5.3 Entry and Cutoffs
As in Chaney (2008), the total mass of potential entrants in country i is κwiLi, where
κ > 0 is a proportionality constant, so that larger and wealthier countries have more
entrants. Without a free entry condition, firms generate net profits that have to be
redistributed. We assume that each consumer owns wi shares of a totally diversified
global fund and that profits are redistributed to them in units of the numéraire good.
The total income Yi spent by workers in country i is the sum of their labor income wiLi
and of the dividends they earn from their portfolio wiLipi, where pi is the dividend per
share of the global mutual fund.
Firms will enter market n only if they can earn positive profits there. Some low
productivity firms may not generate sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs. We
define the productivity threshold z¯in(ηn) from piin(z¯in, ηn) = 0, as the lowest possible
productivity level consistent with non-negative profits in export markets, conditional
on a demand draw ηn,
z¯in(ηn) =
wiτin
[
λ1
(
fin
ηnYn
)1/(1−σ)
Pn − tin
]−1
if tin < t¯in,
∞ if tin 1 t¯in,
(9)
where t¯in = λ1 [fin/ (ηnYn)]
1/(1−σ) Pn, and λ1 = (σ/µ)
1/(1−σ) (σ − 1) /σ is a constant. In
the presence of finite additive trade costs, even the most productive firm receives finite
revenues that may not be sufficient to cover the entry cost in market n. Therefore,
the entry hurdle can be infinite, opening up the possibility of zero trade flows between
country-pairs. Note that, unlike in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), zero trade
flows will emerge without imposing an upper bound on productivity levels. Also unlike
in Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), zero trade flows will emerge without assuming a
finite integer number of firms.
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5.4 Price Levels
Productivity and demand shocks in market n are drawn from a joint distribution with
density f (z, ηn). The price index is then
P 1−σn =
∑
i
κwiLi
ˆ ˆ ∞
z¯in(ηn)
(pin (z) /ηn)
1−σ f (z, ηn) dzdηn. (10)
We can summarize an equilibrium with the following set of equations:
Pn = g (Pn, pi) ∀ n,
pi = h (pi, P1, .., PN) .
The first equation states that the price index is a function of itself (since z¯in(ηn) is a
function of Pn) and the dividend share pi (since z¯in(ηn) is a function of Yn which is
a function of pi). The second equation states that the dividend share is a function of
itself and all price indices. In appendix Section A.3, we explain this further and show
how to numerically solve for the general equilibrium.
6 Welfare and Trade Costs
6.1 Welfare
In this section we show that the gains from trade, defined as the increase in real wages
from going to frictionless trade, are higher in the case of additive barriers compared to
multiplicative barriers, and that the negative impact of additive barriers is exacerbated
in the presence of within-industry price heterogeneity.
To fix ideas, we can consider the case of government-imposed barriers like tariffs
and quotas. Section A.5 in the appendix shows that a significant share of duties are
non-ad valorem (NAVs). In the presence of heterogeneous prices, an additive barrier
acts as a wedge between the prices of any two imported goods (Proposition 2). As a
consequence, an additive barrier affects the relative consumption of different imported
goods. An ad valorem tariff introduces a deadweight loss due to a distortion in the
prices of imported goods relative to the prices of domestic goods. An additive tariff
also features a distortion in consumption among imported goods. This implies that
removing trade barriers is associated with a larger increase in real wages in the additive
case compared to the multiplicative case.
To quantitatively investigate the gains from trade, we simulate a symmetric two-
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country version of the model presented above. First, we choose values commonly used in
the literature for key parameters of the model, such as the elasticity of substitution and
the Pareto slope parameter (Table 6). Second, we use the estimated value of average
trade costs, ¯TCkn from Table 2. To isolate the welfare consequences of additive trade
costs, we focus on the extreme case of only additive costs and set multiplicative costs
to zero (τin = 1).30 Third, given these assumptions, we (i) simulate the baseline model,
(ii) simulate a free trade counterfactual, and (iii) calculate the rise in real wages from
(i) to (ii).
The next step is to evaluate gains from trade in the model under the assumption
that trade costs are purely multiplicative, and they are similar in magnitude to the
additive trade costs used above. However, we face the problem that additive and
multiplicative costs are not directly comparable. To see this, note that the t-equivalent
iceberg cost is τ (t) = p/ (p− t), so that τ (t) depends on the price p.31 Our solution
is to construct three different baseline τ ’s, corresponding to the τ (t) for the firm in
the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the export price distribution, respectively. This
produces τP25 = 1.17, τP50 = 1.14 and τP75 = 1.13. Hence, e.g. in the P25 case, for 75
percent of the firms, τP25 > τ (t). This is a very conservative scenario, as three quarters
of the firms face higher trade costs in the multiplicative case than in the additive case.
We then proceed as above, and (i) simulate the three baseline models, (ii) simulate a
free trade counterfactual, and (iii) calculate the rise in real wages from (i) to (ii).
The main results are shown in Table 5. Column (1) shows the % change in real
wages under the assumption that the Pareto shape coefficient is γ = 4 (Simonovska and
Waugh, 2011). In the t-only scenario, real wages increase by 11.2 percent. In the τ -only
scenarios, the rise is between 5.5 and 6.8 percent. In other words, the gains from trade
are between 65 and 104 percent higher in the additive case versus the multiplicative
case. Column (ii) shows the gains from trade when firm heterogeneity is higher (γ
lower). As expected, the difference between the t and τ cases is now exacerbated,
as across-firm distortions are now greater. Overall, our results suggest that additive
barriers are much more harmful than multiplicative ones, and that eliminating additive
frictions enhances welfare more than eliminating multiplicative ones.
30We use the unweighted mean of TCkn = 0.14 and normalize domestic trade costs to zero. Note
that as TCkn = (tkn/τkn) /p˜kn, the input into the model is t = ¯TCp˜, i.e. average trade cost relative
to the median f.o.b. price multiplied by the median f.o.b. price in the model.
31τ p˜ = p˜+ t⇐⇒ τ (t) = p/ (p− t).
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Table 5: Gains from Trade.
t τ w/p, % change Exports, % change
(1) γ = 4 (2) γ = 3 (3) γ = 4 (4) γ = 3
Yes No 11.2 19.2 106.3 451.3
No τ 25 6.8 6.7 42.0 33.7
No τ 50 5.8 5.7 33.2 26.9
No τ 75 5.5 5.4 30.5 24.7
Note: Columns show % change in real wages and exports from baseline equilibrium to frictionless trade.
τP25 = 1.17, τP50 = 1.14 and τP75 = 1.13.
Table 6: Parameter values and data used in the simulation.
Notation Description Value Source
γ Pareto shape parameter 4 Simonovska and Waugh (2011)
f Fixed costs 0.7m USD 2004 Das, Roberts and Tybout (2008)1
wL GDP Norway 2004 260,029m USD World Bank, current USD.
σ Elasticity of substitution 4.0 Broda and Weinstein (2006), mean SITC 3-digit.
Notes: 10,000 draws used in simulation. 1In their paper, the average cost of foreign market entry is estimated to
be 0.4m in 1986-USD which is approximately 0.7m 2004-USD.
6.2 Trade Flows
Our simulation also allows us to examine the growth in trade as trade barriers are
removed. Intuitively, the additional distortions associated with additive barriers should
also dampen trade, so that removing trade barriers will result in higher trade growth in
the additive versus multiplicative scenario. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 indeed show
that this is the case. Compared to the conservative τP25 baseline, removing additive
barriers generates more than twice the growth in exports. In other words, even if
the majority of firms face higher trade barriers in the multiplicative case then the
additive case, removing the additive barriers produces much more trade. This result
suggests that inferring (iceberg) trade costs from trade flows using gravity models, as
in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), may overstate trade barriers, as additive costs
dampen trade much more than multiplicative costs. It is well known that standard
models have difficulties matching the growth in global trade over time (e.g., Yi, 2003);
our results suggest that additive trade costs may play an important role. We leave
these important questions for future research.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a new methodology for estimating trade costs. An impor-
tant property of our framework, which provides the basis for identification, is that an
increase in additive trade costs has a systematically different impact on the demand
elasticity among low price versus high price firms. It is the marriage of additive costs
and price heterogeneity, within narrowly defined industries, that drives the theoretical
and empirical results in this paper.
We structurally estimate the magnitude of additive trade costs, for every prod-
uct and destination in our dataset. Estimated additive trade costs are on average
14 percent, expressed relative to the median price. They are quite heterogeneous
across product-destination pairs, and as expected, are highly correlated with distance
and product weight/value ratios. We reject the null hypothesis of zero additive trade
costs (i.e. a model with iceberg costs exclusively) for the large majority of product-
destination pairs.
Using our micro estimates, we show that both the welfare and the trade flows
impact of additive trade costs is much higher than the impact of multiplicative trade
costs. A reduction in additive trade costs would imply higher welfare gains and larger
increases in trade flows than an equivalent reduction in multiplicative trade costs. We
show that, especially in industries where price heterogeneity is high, the gains from
trade can be much higher if markets are protected by additive instead of multiplicative
barriers. Hence, firm level heterogeneity matters for aggregate outcomes, such as gains
from trade. Furthermore, additive trade costs can help us understand the prevalence of
zeros in bilateral trade flows. We conclude that empirical and theoretical work should
account for both (the tip of the) iceberg costs, as well as the part of trade costs that
are largely hidden under the surface: additive costs.
Our quantitative framework is potentially useful in a number of applications. Trade
costs can easily be estimated for other countries and years, as firm-level trade data are
now available for a number of developing and developed countries. For future work,
our analysis points to the need for further research in understanding the time-series
and geographic response of aggregate trade flows to additive trade costs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the quantity demanded x = Y P σ−1p−σησ−1 for a variety with con-
sumer price p and demand shock η. Let, as in equation (1), p = τ p˜ + t. Using the
chain rule, E is the product of the elasticity of quantity demanded with respect to the
consumer price and the elasticity of the consumer price with respect to the f.o.b. price
(p˜),
E (p˜, t, τ, σ) =
∂ lnx
∂ ln p˜
=
∂ lnx
∂ ln p
∂ ln p
∂ ln p˜
= −σ
(
1− t
p
)
< 0,
since
∂ lnx
∂ ln p
= −σ < 0,
∂ ln p
∂ ln p˜
= τ p˜
τ p˜+t
=
(
1− t
p
)
≥ 0.
since σ > 1 and p ≥ t.
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In the absence of additive trade costs (t = 0), ∂ ln p/∂ ln p˜ = 1 so that the elasticity
of quantity demanded with respect to the f.o.b. price is equal to the elasticity of
substitution across varieties. In the presence of additive trade costs (t > 0), the
following results apply:
∂E
∂t
t
E
= − σ
E
∂
(
1− t
p
)
∂ ln t
=
σt
Ep2
(p− t) = σtτ p˜
Ep2
≤ 0,
since σ > 1, t ≥ 0, τ ≥ 1, p˜ > 0, and E < 0. This shows that, in the presence of
additive trade costs, the elasticity of E to additive trade costs is negative. Finally,
∂
∂p˜
(
∂E
∂t
t
E
)
= σtτ
∂
∂p˜
(
p˜
Ep2
)
= σtτ
(
1
Ep2
− p˜
E2p4
(
p2
∂E
∂p˜
+ E
∂p2
∂p˜
))
= σtτ
(
1
Ep2
− p˜
E2p4
(−σtτ + 2pτE)
)
=
σtτ
Ep2
(
1 +
στ p˜
Ep2
(2τ p˜+ t)
)
=
σtτ
Ep2
(
1− 2τ p˜+ t
p
)
= −σtp˜τ
2
Ep3
> 0
since
∂E
∂p˜
= −σtτ
p2
and
∂p2
∂p˜
= 2pτ.
This shows that the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs t is strictly
increasing in the producer price p˜.
A.2 A Broader Class of Demand Systems
In this section we show how Proposition 1 and the identification strategy used in the
estimation of trade costs extend to a general class of demand systems.
A.2.1 General Demand System
Similarly to Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012b), we consider
a general demand system for differentiated goods. All consumers have the same prefer-
ences. If a consumer with income w faces a vector of prices p, her Marshallian demand
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for any differentiated good takes the form
lnx (p, p∗, w) = −β ln p+ γ lnw + f (ln p− ln p∗) , (11)
where x and p are quantity and consumer price respectively, and w is income. p∗ (p) is a
price index which is symmetric in all prices p. Hence, other prices only affect demand
through their effect on the aggregator p∗. Depending on the assumptions on β, γ,
f(.), and p∗, the above framework encompasses, among others, four different utility
functions that have been widely used in the literature: (a) CES utility; (b) quadratic,
but non-separable utility, as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002); (c) a translog
expenditure function, as in Feenstra (2003), and (d) additively quasi-separable utility,
as considered by Behrens and Murata (2007).32
Table 7 summarizes the results regarding Proposition 1. In the absence of additive
trade costs, the elasticity of the quantity demanded to the producer price is (−β+ f ′).
In the presence of additive trade costs, the elasticity becomes
E = (−β + f ′)
(
1− t
p
)
.
The elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs is
∂E
∂t
t
E
=
t
E
f ′′
p
(1− t/p)− t
E
(−β + f ′) p− t
p2
=
t
p
(
f ′′
f ′ − β −
1
1− t/p
1− t/p
1
)
=
t
p
(
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1
)
.
Note that the sign of the previous elasticity varies with the type of preferences con-
sidered. In the case of quadratic, but non-separable utility function, as in Ottaviano,
Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002),
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1 =
1
e−s − 1 > 0,
32Specifically, γ = 1, f(s) = (1− σ) s, β = 1 in case (a); β = −1, γ = 0, and f(s) = − lnκ2 +
ln (e−s − 1) in case (b); β = γ = 1 and f (s) = lnξ + ln (−s) in case (c); and β = γ = 0 and
f(s) = ln ζ + ln (−s) in case (d).
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since s < 0. In the case of translog preferences, as in Feenstra (2003),
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1 = −
1 + s (1− s)
s (1− s) ,
where
1 + s (1− s) > 0,
so that ∂E
∂t
t
E
< 0 for −1+
√
5
−2 < s < 0. In the case of Behrens and Murata (2007)
preferences,
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1 =
−1− s
s
< 0,
for −1 < s < 0.
Finally, we show under what conditions the elasticity of E with respect to additive
trade costs is increasing in p˜.
∂
∂ ln p
(
∂E
∂t
t
E
)
= −te−lnp
(
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1
)
+ te−lnp
f ′′′ (f ′ − β)− f ′′2
(f ′ − β)2
= − t
p
(
f ′′
f ′ − β − 1
)
+
t
p
f ′′′ − f ′′2/ (f ′ − β)
f ′ − β
=
t
p (f ′ − β)2
[
(f ′ − β)2 + (f ′′′ − f ′′) (f ′ − β)− f ′′2
]
.
Therefore, as long as
(f ′ − β)2 + (f ′′′ − f ′′) (f ′ − β)− f ′′2 > 0, (12)
the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs is increasing in ln p. Given
that ∂ ln p/∂p˜ = τ/p > 0, the same condition guarantees that the elasticity of E with
respect to additive trade costs is increasing in p˜.
In the case of quadratic, but non-separable utility function, as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi,
and Thisse (2002), condition (12) becomes(
− e
−x
(e−x − 1) − β
)2
+
(
−(e
−x + e−2x)
(e−x − 1)3 +
e−x
(e−x − 1)2
)(
− e
−x
(e−x − 1) − β
)
− e
−2x
(e−x − 1)4
=
1
(e−x − 1)2 +
2e−x
(e−x − 1)3
1
(e−x − 1) −
e−2x
(e−x − 1)4
=
2e−x − e−2x + (e−x − 1)2
(e−x − 1)4 = 1 > 0,
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CES Quadratic Translog Behrens & Murata (2007)
∂ ln x
∂ ln p˜
|t=0 −σ < 0 − 1
e−s−1 < 0
1−s
s
< 0 1
s
< 0
E = ∂ ln x
∂ ln p˜
|t>0 −σ
(
1− t
p
)
< 0 − 1
e−s−1
(
1− t
p
)
< 0 1−s
s
(
1− t
p
)
< 0 1
s
(
1− t
p
)
< 0
∂E
∂t
t
E
< 0 > 0
< 0 if 1−
√
5
2
< s < 0
> 0 if s < 1−
√
5
2
< 0 if − 1 < s < 0
> 0 if s < −1
∂
∂ ln p˜
(
∂E
∂t
t
E
)
> 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Table 7: Demand systems and additive trade costs.
which is clearly satisfied.
In the case of translog preferences, as in Feenstra (2003), condition (12) becomes
1− 2x−1 + x−4 − x−3 > 0,
which is clearly satisfied since x < 0.
In the case of Behrens and Murata (2007) preferences, condition (12) becomes
(
x−1
)2
+
(
2x−3 + x−2
) (
x−1
)− x−4
= x−4
(
1 + x2 + x
)
> 0,
which is clearly satisfied since x < 0.
Table 7 summarizes the signs of E, (∂E/∂t) / (E/t) and ∂ [(∂E/∂t) / (E/t)] /∂ ln p˜
under the different demand systems (recall that s = ln p− ln p∗ ≤ 0).
In sum, under all demand systems considered here, the finding in Proposition 1,
that the elasticity of E with respect to additive trade costs t is strictly increasing
in the producer price p˜, continues to hold. The reduced form evidence in Table 1
(comparing (∂E/∂Dist) / (E/Dist) for high and low price firms) therefore still holds
in the more general case. The structural estimation in Section 4 can also be extended
so that the demand elasticity with respect to the c.i.f. price is allowed to vary over
the price distribution. Specifically, instead of the linear specification in equation (4),
a non-linear specification with higher-order polynomial terms can be used.
A.3 Simulating the Model
A.3.1 Numerical approximation
In this subsection we show how to simulate the model numerically. The numerical
approximation of the equilibrium consists of the following steps.
1. Choose a starting value of the the dividend share and the price indices, pi0 and
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P 0n , where superscripts denote the round of iteration.
2. Solve the the system of N + 1 equations and N + 1 unknowns characterized by
P dn = g
(
P d−1n , pi
d−1) ∀ n,
pid = h
(
pid−1, P d−11 , .., P
d−1
N
)
,
as shown in the main text. This involves solving the equilibrium cutoffs (9) and
the expression for the price index (10).
3. Iterate over 2. When
∣∣P dn − P d−1n ∣∣ and |pid − pid−1| are sufficiently small, the
equilibrium
(
{Pn}Nn=1 , pi
)
is found.
Since the price index has no closed-form solution, we approximate it with Monte Carlo
methods. Specifically, we take R = 1e + 5 random draws zr and ηr from the density
f (z, ηn). An integral of the form
ˆ ˆ ∞
z¯in(ηn)
k (z, ηn) f (z, ηn) dzdηn,
for an arbitrary function k(.), is approximated by taking the mean of k (z, ηn) over
(zr, ηr) draws that satisfy zr > z¯in(ηn), and adjusting by multiplying with the share of
observations that satisfy zr > z¯in(ηn),
mean [k (zr, ηrn) |zr > z¯in(ηn)] ×
#obs where zr > z¯in(ηn)
R
.
A.3.2 Global Profits
Each worker owns wn shares of a global fund. The fund collects global profits Π from
all firms and redistributes them in units of the numéraire good to its shareholders.
Dividend per share in the economy is defined as pi = Π/
∑
wiLi, and total labor
income is Yn = wnLn (1 + pi). Profits for country i firms selling to market n are
piin =
Sin
σ
− ninfin,
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where Sin denotes total sales from i to n, nin is the number of entrants, and fin is the
entry cost. Global profits are then
Π =
∑
i
∑
n
(
Sin
σ
− ninfin
)
=
∑
n
Yn/σ −
∑
i
∑
n
ninfin.
Note that
∑
i Sin is simply µkYn. Dividend per share is then:
pi =
Π∑
iwiLi
=
(1/σ)
∑
n Yn −
∑
i
∑
n ninfin∑
wiLi
=
(1/σ) (1 + pi)
∑
nwnLn −
∑
i
∑
n ninfin∑
wiLi
.
Solving for pi yields
pi =
1/σ −
∑
i
∑
n ninfin∑
wiLi
1− 1/σ .
Note that since nin = κwiLi
´ ´
z¯in(ηn)
f (z, ηn) dzdηn, pi is only a function of the entry
hurdle function z¯in (ηn). Replacing z¯in (ηn) with the entry hurdle expression (9), pi
becomes a function of itself and the price indices, pi = h (pi, P1, .., PN) (suppressing all
exogenous variables).
A.4 Selection bias
Firms are not randomly entering into different product-destinations and this can create
a correlation between prices and the error term. In this section, we show that selection
may bias the incidental slope coefficient, but not the trade costs coefficients.
According to the model, a firm with a demand shock ηn enters market n if its
productivity is above the threshold zkn (ηknr), i.e. zknr > zkn (ηknr). Alternatively,
we can re-express the entry hurdle in terms of the highest price the firm can charge,
conditional on a demand shock, pknr < pkn (ηknr). Assuming we find a suitable log-
linear approximation ln pkn (ηknr) ≈ ξkn + ln ηknr, we write the entry condition as
ln pknr − ln ξkn − ln ηknr > 0.
Export volume is, from equation (4),
lnxknr = akn + σk ln pknr + (σk − 1) ln ηknr.
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Since ln ηknr determines both entry and sales, the error term is correlated with price
ln pknr. Using standard methods, and assuming that ln ηknr is normal, we find the
expectation of the error term in the export volume equation,
E [ln ηknr| ln pknr − ln ξkn − ln ηknr > 0] = λ [ln pknr − ln ξkn]
where λ is the Mills ratio, λ (z) = φ (z) /Φ (z). Heckman’s two step procedure suggests
the following regression,
lnxknr = akn − σk ln pknr + λ [ln pknr − ln ξkn] + vknr.
Approximating the Mills ratio with the polynomial λ () = aˇkn − σˇk ln pknr, we get
lnxknr = akn + aˇkn − (σk + σˇk) ln pknr + vknr.
Hence, the incidental slope coefficients suffer from selection bias, but the the parameter
of interest t˜kn remains unchanged.
A.5 The prevalence of non-ad valorem duties (NAVs)
A significant share of duties are non-ad valorem (NAVs). According to the WTO World
Tariff Profiles (2006), “NAVs are applied by 68 out of the 151 countries shown in this
publication including several LDCs...” Table 8 reports, for a set of countries, the share
of Harmonized System six-digit subheadings (both for agricultural and non-agricultural
products) subject to non-ad valorem duties. The share of products subject to NAVs
is usually higher in the case of agricultural products but is also important for non-
agricultural products. For example, in the United States, the 3.4% of non-agricultural
products that are subject to NAVs account for 18.9% of imports. Still according to
the WTO World Tariff Profiles (2006) “One of the peculiarities of NAVs resides in
the fact that even if they are applied to a limited number of tariff lines, the products
concerned are often classified as sensitive, either because governments collect significant
tariff revenues, e.g. cigarettes and alcoholic drinks, or for protecting domestic products
against lower priced imports. These highlight the importance of analyzing NAVs.”
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Table 8: Non-ad Valorem Tariffs and Tariff Quotas
NAV (in %) Tariff quotas
MFN Applied Imports (in %)
United States AG 39.9 33.9 9.5
NAG 3.4 18.9
European Communities AG 31.0 24.5 15.1
NAG 0.6 0.5
Russian Federation AG 25.6 58.6 n.a.
NAG 10.1 6.1
China AG 0.3 1.3 5.0
NAG 0.4 0.1
Switzerland AG 73.0 80.3 24.7
NAG 81.3 62.7
Japan AG 13.8 17.0 9.5
NAG 2.1 2.0
Note: NAV (in %) corresponds to the share of HS six-digit subheadings subject to non-ad valorem
duties under the non-discrimination principle of most-favored nation (MFN). When only part of the HS
six-digit subheading is subject to non-ad valorem duties, the percentage share of these tariff lines is
used. Tariff quotas (in %) corresponds to the percentage of HS six-digit subheadings in the schedule
of agricultural concession covered by tariff quotas. Partial coverage is taken into account on a pro rata
basis. Only duties and imports recorded under HS Chapters 01-97 are taken into account. AG stands
for "agricultural" while NAG for "non-agricultural" products. Source: WTO World Tariff Profiles 2006.
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